# **Evaluation of LLM Vulnerabilities to Being Misused** for Personalized Disinformation Generation

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Why? LLMs are capable to generate disinformation. But can they generate personalized disinformation?

Results. LLMs can generate high-quality personalized disinformation content

# Methodology

Disinformation news articles were generated for 6 narratives

- for 7 target groups by 6 LLMs (private & open)

3 formats of prompts (no, simple and detailed personalization)

We have manually and automatically evaluated

- text linguistic quality
- stance towards the narrative
- quality of personalization

	Narrative title	Category		
H1	People die after being vaccinated against COVID-19	Health		
H2	2 Cannabis is a "cancer killer"			
<b>H3</b>	Planes are spraying chemtrails	Health		
P1	EU wants to conceal the presence of the insects	<b>Politics</b>		
	in products with the intent to force its citizens			
	to eat insects			
P2	Ukraine hosts secret US bio-labs	<b>Politics</b>		
P3	Bucha massacre was staged	<b>Politics</b>		


#### **Target groups:**

- political affiliation (European conservatives and European liberals)
- area of residence (Rural, Urban)
- age (Students, Parents, Seniors)

	Mean (± Standard deviation)						
Generator	Characters	Words	Lines	Sentences	GRUEN	LA	OCQ
Falcon-40b-Instruct	3144.90 (±1207.27)	478.13 (±183.47)	13.97 (±7.54)	20.41 (±8.82)	0.77 (±0.16)	1.96 (±0.20)	1.52 (±0.55)
GPT-40-2024-08-06	3299.20 (±380.94)	473.56 (±54.00)	17.59 (±4.49)	19.88 (±2.83)	0.82 (±0.07)	2.00 (±0.00)	1.90 (±0.29)
Gemma-2-27b-IT	1978.12 (±478.74)	283.79 (±76.22)	18.28 (±3.77)	15.60 (±5.70)	0.73 (±0.17)	2.00 (±0.00)	1.97 (±0.17)
Llama-3.1-70B-Instruct	2985.14 (±605.54)	436.14 (±85.41)	20.42 (±7.39)	21.47 (±5.85)	0.76 (±0.14)	1.98 (±0.17)	1.42 (±0.56)
Mistral-Nemo-Instruct-2407	3238.26 (±547.73)	467.48 (±73.38)	29.06 (±7.69)	24.81 (±6.19)	0.73 (±0.16)	2.00 (±0.05)	1.80 (±0.40)
Vicuna-33b-v1.3	2352.17 (±530.52)	348.86 (±76.79)	15.93 (±5.70)	14.54 (±4.05)	0.78 (±0.11)	1.94 (±0.23)	1.39 (±0.56)

## RQ1: Are current large language models capable of generating personalized disinformation?

- All examined LLMs generated at least some high quality well-personalized disinformation texts
  - Falcon offers the lowest personalization quality
  - Gemma offers the safest behavior





RECOVERY AND RESILIENCE




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#### RQ2: Are LLMs usable to evaluate personalization of the generated texts with correlation to human judgment?

There is a strong (Spearman  $\rho$  = 0.76) and statistically significant correlation of personalization-quality metaevaluation with human judgment

evaluated on a balanced subset



## RQ3: Does personalization affect detectability of generated disinformation as being generated by AI?

Personalization reduces the detectability of generated disinformation

Personalization		TPR		
Prompt	Gemma-2-9b-IT	<b>Detection-Longformer</b>	<b>Binoculars</b>	<b>Average</b>
No	0.9960	0.8968	0.8333	0.9087
Simple	0.9960	0.8519	0.8294	0.8924
Detailed	0.9960	0.8333	0.8029	0.8774
All	0.9960	0.8607	0.8219	0.8929

	TPR				
Generator	Gemma-2-9b-IT	<b>Detection-Longformer</b>	<b>Binoculars</b>	Average	
Falcon-40b-Instruct	0.9894	0.9868	0.6376	0.8713	
GPT-40-2024-08-06	0.9974	0.8624	0.9471	0.9356	
Gemma-2-27b-IT	1.0000	0.7672	0.8889	0.8854	
Llama-3.1-70B-Instruct	0.9894	0.9550	0.7593	0.9012	
Mistral-Nemo-Instruct-2407	1.0000	0.6614	0.7354	0.7989	
Vicuna-33b-v1.3	1.0000	0.9312	0.9630	0.9647	
All	0.9960	0.8607	0.8219	0.8929	

#### Contributions

- The first systematic evaluation of LLMs misuse potential for generation of personalized disinformation
- We confirmed that the state-of-the-art LLMs can generate high-quality personalized disinformation content
- personalization even further decreases the activation of safety filters
- Personalized generation even decrease the accuracy of machine-generated text detectors

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